

Indian Statistical Institute, Bangalore

B. Math. Second Year

First Semester - Optimization

Duration : 3 hours

Date : November 22, 2017

Semester Exam

Total marks: 50

Section I: Answer any four and each question carries 6 marks.

1. Prove QR -decomposition for full column rank matrices and prove the decomposition is unique if R is required to have positive entries on the diagonal.

Solution: Let A be an $m \times n$ matrix with $m \geq n$ and rank of A is n . Let a_i be the i th column of A . Then $\{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$ is a linearly independent set in \mathbb{R}^m .

Let

$$u_1 = a_1, u_2 = \frac{\langle u_1, a_2 \rangle}{\|u_1\|^2} u_1, \quad (1)$$

$$u_i = a_i - \sum_{k=1}^{i-1} \frac{\langle u_k, a_i \rangle}{\|u_k\|^2} u_k. \quad (2)$$

Let $\bar{e}_i = \frac{u_i}{\|u_i\|}$ for all $i \leq i \leq n$. Then $\{\bar{e}_1, \dots, \bar{e}_n\}$ is an orthonormal set, such that $\text{span}\{\bar{e}_1, \dots, \bar{e}_n\} = \text{span}\{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$. Let $Q = [\bar{e}_1 \dots \bar{e}_n]$. Then Q is an $m \times n$ orthogonal matrix.

$$\text{Let } R = \begin{pmatrix} \langle \bar{e}_1, a_1 \rangle & \langle \bar{e}_1, a_2 \rangle & \dots & \langle \bar{e}_1, a_n \rangle \\ 0 & \langle \bar{e}_2, a_2 \rangle & \dots & \langle \bar{e}_2, a_n \rangle \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & \langle \bar{e}_n, a_n \rangle \end{pmatrix}$$

Then $A = QR$.

Now we show that the QR -decomposition is unique if R is required to have positive entries on the diagonal. Let

$$A = Q_1 R_1 = Q_2 R_2.$$

Now

$$R_1^t R_1 = R_1^t Q_1^t Q_1 R_1 = (Q_1 R_1)^t Q_1 R_1 = A^t A.$$

Similarly, $R_2^t R_2 = A^t A$. Now

$$R_2 R_1^{-1} = (R_2^t)^{-1} R_1^t = ((R_2 R_1^{-1})^t)^{-1}.$$

$R_2R_1^{-1}$ is upper triangular and $((R_2R_1^{-1})^t)^{-1}$ is lower triangular. Hence $R_2R_1^{-1} = D$, where D is a diagonal matrix. But again $D = (D^t)^{-1} = D^{-1}$, which implies that D is the identity matrix. Hence $R_1 = R_2$ and consequently $Q_1 = Q_2$.

2. If $A = UDV^t$ is the singular value decomposition, prove that $Ax = b$ has a solution if and only if $b \perp U_i$ for all $i > k$ where k is the rank of A .

Solution: Let $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_k$ be the singular values of A . Then the non-zero entries of the diagonal matrix D are $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_k$ respectively.

Now

$$Ax = b \Leftrightarrow UDV^tx = b \Leftrightarrow DV^tx = U^tb.$$

As D is a diagonal matrix with first k entries being non-zero and

$$U^tb = \begin{pmatrix} \langle U_1, b \rangle \\ \langle U_2, b \rangle \\ \vdots \\ \langle U_m, b \rangle \end{pmatrix},$$

it follows that $Ax = b$ has a solution if and only if $b \perp U_i$ for all $i > k$.

3. Prove that $\text{Spr}(A)$ has algebraic multiplicity one for a nonnegative irreducible matrix A .

Solution: Let $r = \text{Spr}(A)$ and $\phi(\lambda) = \det(\lambda I - A)$, where I is the identity matrix. it is enough to show that $\phi'(r) \neq 0$. Let $(\lambda I - A)_{kl}$ be the matrix obtained from $(\lambda I - A)$ by deleting k th row and l th column. Let

$$c_{ij}(\lambda) = (-1)^{i+j} \det[(\lambda I - A)_{ij}] \forall i, j.$$

Let $c(\lambda) = (c_{ij}(\lambda))$. Then

$$[(\lambda I - A)c(\lambda)] = \phi(\lambda)I = c(\lambda)(\lambda I - A).$$

Differentiating with respect to λ , we get

$$c'(\lambda)(\lambda I - A) + c(\lambda) = \phi'(\lambda)I.$$

Putting $\lambda = r$, we get

$$c'(r)(rI - A) + c(r) = \phi'(r)I.$$

Let $T = \begin{pmatrix} A_1 & O_{n-1 \times 1} \\ O_{1 \times n-1} & 0 \end{pmatrix}$, where A_1 is obtained from A by deleting the n th row and n th column. Then $T \geq 0$ and $A \geq T$. Moreover T is not irreducible. Hence $T \neq A$. Since $A \geq T$, $r = \text{Spr}(A) \geq \text{Spr}(T)$ and $(rI - T)$ is one-one. Therefore, $c(r) \neq 0$. Let $u \in C_A \cap B$ such that $A(u) = ru$. Now

$$\begin{aligned} c'(r)(rI - A)(u) + c(r)u &= \phi'(r)I(u) \\ \Rightarrow c(r)(u) &= \phi'(r)(u) \\ \Rightarrow \sum c(r)_{nj}u_j &= \phi'(r)u_n. \end{aligned}$$

We have $u \in C_A \cap B$ and $A(u) = ru$, which implies that

$$(rI - A)c(r) = \phi(r)I = O_{n \times n}.$$

Hence $(rI - A)c_j = 0$, where c_j is the j th column of $c(r)$. So, $A(c_j) = rc_j$ for all j . Therefore, all column vectors of $c(r)$ are eigenvectors of A corresponding to the eigenvalue r . Since the eigenvalue r has geometric multiplicity 1, it follows that each column of $c(r)$ is a multiple of u .

Now A^t is also non-negative and irreducible and $\text{Spr}(A) = \text{Spr}(A^t) = r$. There exists $v \in B$ such that $A^t(v) = rv$ and $v_i > 0$ for all i . It follows as above that all rows of $c(r)$ are constant multiples of v . Therefore, $c(r)_n^t$ is a non-zero vector with all components having same sign. Hence

$$\sum_{j=1}^n c_{nj}(r)u_j \neq 0 \quad (u_j \neq 0).$$

Then it follows that $(c(r)u)_n \neq 0$. So, $\phi'(r)u = c(r)u \neq 0$, which implies that $\phi'(r) \neq 0$.

4. Solve by simplex method

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Maximize} \quad & 9x_1 + 10x_2 \\ \text{subj} \quad & x_1 + 2x_2 \leq 8 \\ & 5x_1 + 2x_2 \leq 16 \\ & x \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Solution: Starting with the initial simplex tableau and applying simplex method, we get

$$\begin{array}{ccccc|c} x_1 & x_2 & x_3 & x_4 & z & \\ \hline 1 & 2 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 8 \\ 5 & 2 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 16 \\ \hline -9 & -10 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{array} \quad (3)$$

Applying the operation $\frac{1}{2}R_1$ we get

$$\begin{array}{ccccc|c}
 x_1 & x_2 & x_3 & x_4 & z & \\
 \hline
 1/2 & 1 & 1/2 & 0 & 0 & 4 \\
 5 & 2 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 16 \\
 \hline
 -9 & -10 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0
 \end{array} \tag{4}$$

Then applying $R_2 - 2R_1$ and $R_3 + 10R_1$, we get

$$\begin{array}{ccccc|c}
 x_1 & x_2 & x_3 & x_4 & z & \\
 \hline
 1/2 & 1 & 1/2 & 0 & 0 & 4 \\
 4 & 0 & -1 & 1 & 0 & 8 \\
 \hline
 -4 & 0 & 5 & 0 & 1 & 40
 \end{array} \tag{5}$$

Again $\frac{1}{4}R_2$ gives

$$\begin{array}{ccccc|c}
 x_1 & x_2 & x_3 & x_4 & z & \\
 \hline
 1/2 & 1 & 1/2 & 0 & 0 & 4 \\
 1 & 0 & -1/4 & 1/4 & 0 & 2 \\
 \hline
 -4 & 0 & 5 & 0 & 1 & 40
 \end{array} \tag{6}$$

Then applying $R_1 - \frac{1}{2}R_2$ and $R_3 + 4R_2$, we get

$$\begin{array}{ccccc|c}
 x_1 & x_2 & x_3 & x_4 & z & \\
 \hline
 0 & 1 & 5/8 & 1/8 & 0 & 3 \\
 1 & 0 & -1/4 & 1/4 & 0 & 2 \\
 \hline
 0 & 0 & 4 & 1 & 1 & 48
 \end{array} \tag{7}$$

Hence the optimal solution is $x_1 = 2$, $x_2 = 3$ and the maximum value is 48.

5. Solve the following game: Ruby conceals either a Rs. 1 coin or Rs. 2 coin in her hand; Charm guesses 1 or 2, winning the coin if he guesses the number.

Solution: The matrix corresponding to this game is

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 \end{pmatrix}$$

. Therefore, it does not have any saddle point, so it is a non-strictly determind game. Hence the optimal strategies are given by, $p^* = (p_1^*, p_2^*)^t$ and $q^* = (q_1^*, q_2^*)^t$, where

$$p_1^* = \frac{d - c}{(a - b) - (c - d)} = \frac{2}{3},$$

$$p_2^* = \frac{a - b}{(a - b) - (c - d)} = \frac{1}{3},$$

$$q_1^* = \frac{d - b}{(a - b) - (c - d)} = \frac{2}{3},$$

$$q_2^* = \frac{a - c}{(a - b) - (c - d)} = \frac{1}{3}.$$

6. Prove the existence and uniqueness of minimum norm least square solution to $Ax = b$.

Solution: Let A be an $m \times n$ matrix and $A = UDV^t$ be a singular value decomposition of A . $D = \text{diag}(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_r)$, $r = \rho(A)$. Then the minimum norm least square solution to $Ax = b$ is given by $\bar{x} = VD^+U^tb$, where $D^+ = \text{diag}(\frac{1}{\sigma_1}, \dots, \frac{1}{\sigma_r})$.

$$\|Ax - b\|^2 = \|UDV^tx - b\|^2 = \|DV^tx - U^tb\|^2$$

. Let $y = V^tx$, $c = U^tb$, then $\|y\| = \|x\|$. Now

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} \|Ax - b\|^2 = \min_{y \in \mathbb{R}^n} \|Dy - c\|^2.$$

$$\|Dy - c\|^2 = \sum_{i=1}^r (\sigma_i y_i - c_i)^2 + \sum_{i>r} c_i^2 \geq \sum_{i>r} c_i^2$$

. Define the vector \bar{y} as follows: the i th entry is $\frac{c_i}{\sigma_i}$ if $i \leq r$ and the i th entry is 0 if $i > r$. Then

$$\|D\bar{y} - c\|^2 = \sum_{i>r} c_i^2 \leq \|Dy - c\|^2$$

for all $y \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Now

$$\|Dy - c\|^2 = \sum_{i>r} c_i^2 \Rightarrow y_i = \frac{c_i}{\sigma_i} \forall i \leq r \Rightarrow \|y\| \geq \|\bar{y}\|.$$

Hence the proof of existence and uniqueness.

Section II: Answer any two and each question carries 13 marks.

1. (a) Let s_i be the i -th singular value of A . Prove that $s_i \leq \|A - B\|$ for any matrix B with $\text{rank}(B) < i$ (Marks: 7).

Solution: Let A be of order $p \times q$ and $A = VDU^*$ be the singular value decomposition of A , where $D = \text{diag}(s_1, \dots, s_r)$. Let B be a $p \times q$ matrix such

that $\text{rank}(B) < i$. Let u_i denote the i th column of U and v_i denote the i th column of V . Let

$$U_1 = [u_1, \dots, u_i, 0, \dots, 0]$$

and

$$V_1 = [v_1, \dots, v_i, 0, \dots, 0].$$

Since $\text{rank}(V_1^* B U_1) \leq \text{rank}(B) \leq i - 1$, there exists $c \in \mathbb{C}^q$ such that $\|c\| = 1$, $c \in \text{span}\{e_1, \dots, e_i\}$ and

$$\begin{aligned} V_1^* B U_1(c) &= 0 \\ \Rightarrow \sum_{j=1}^i c_j \langle B(u_j), v_k \rangle &= 0 \forall 1 \leq k \leq i \\ \Rightarrow \left\langle B\left(\sum_{j=1}^i c_j u_j\right), v_k \right\rangle &= 0, 1 \leq k \leq i. \end{aligned}$$

Now let $x = \sum_{j=1}^i c_j u_j$, then $B(x) \perp v_k \forall 1 \leq k \leq i$. We know $A = \sum_{j=1}^r s_j v_j u_j^*$.

Then

$$A(x) = \sum_{l,j} s_l c_j v_l u_l^* u_j = \sum_{j=1}^i s_j c_j v_j.$$

Now

$$\begin{aligned} \|A(x) - B(x)\|^2 &= \left\| \sum_{j=1}^i s_j c_j v_j - \sum_{j=i+1}^p \langle B(x), v_j \rangle v_j \right\|^2 \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^i |s_j|^2 |c_j|^2 + \sum_{j=i+1}^p |\langle B(x), v_j \rangle|^2. \end{aligned}$$

Hence

$$\|A(x) - B(x)\| \geq s_i.$$

As $x = \sum_{j=1}^i c_j u_j$ and $\|c\| = 1$, it follows that $\|x\| = 1$. Hence $s_i \leq \|A - B\|$.

(b) For $A = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{1}{3} & 0 & \frac{2}{3} \\ \frac{1}{3} & \frac{2}{3} & 0 \end{pmatrix}$, use Perron-Frobenius theory to compute $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} A^n$.

Solution: A is a primitive (since A^2 is a positive matrix) and stochastic matrix. So, 1 is the dominant eigenvalue for A and A^t as well. Also let $u = (1, 1, 1)^t$

and $v = (1/4, 3/8, 3/8)$. Then it is easy to see that $A(u) = u$ and $A^t(v) = v$. We also note that $\langle u, v \rangle = 1$. Hence, by Perron-Frobenius theory,

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} A^n = uv^t = \begin{pmatrix} 1/4 & 3/8 & 3/8 \\ 1/4 & 3/8 & 3/8 \\ 1/4 & 3/8 & 3/8 \end{pmatrix}.$$

P.T.O

2. (a) Let $A \geq 0$ be a primitive matrix, v and u be positive eigenvectors for A and A^t with eigenvalue $\lambda = \text{Spr}(A)$. If $u^t v = 1$ and $r = \text{Spr}(A)$, prove that $(\frac{A}{r})^n \rightarrow vu^t$ exponentially (Marks: 6).

Solution: Let $M = vu^t$. Note that

$$u^t M = u^t v u^t = u^t$$

and

$$M(v) = v u^t v = v.$$

Now let $W = \langle u \rangle^\perp$. For $w \in W$

$$\langle u, A(w) \rangle = \langle A^t(u), w \rangle = \lambda \langle u, w \rangle = 0.$$

Hence $A(w) \in W$ and therefore, W is an invariant subspace for A . Also for $w \in W$,

$$M(w) = v u^t w = 0.$$

Let T be an operator such that $T(w) = A(w)$ for $w \in W$ and $T(u) = 0$. Then $\text{Spr}(T) < \text{Spr}(A)$. Let $\beta = \text{Spr}(T)$ and $\varepsilon > 0$ be such that $\beta + \varepsilon < \lambda$. Then we know that there exists $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$\|T^n\|^{1/n} \leq \beta + \varepsilon \quad \forall n \geq N.$$

$$i.e. \|T^n\| \leq (\beta + \varepsilon)^n \quad \forall n \geq N.$$

Now for $w \in W$,

$$\begin{aligned} \left\| \left(\frac{A}{\lambda} \right)^n (w) \right\| &= \left(\frac{1}{\lambda} \right)^n \|A^n(w)\| = \left(\frac{1}{\lambda} \right)^n \|T^n(w)\| \\ &\leq \frac{1}{\lambda^n} \|T^n\| \|w\| \leq \left(\frac{\beta + \varepsilon}{\lambda} \right)^n \|w\|, \end{aligned}$$

which tends to 0 exponentially as $n \rightarrow \infty$. This implies that $(\frac{A}{\lambda})^n \rightarrow M = vu^t$ exponentially, since $(\frac{A}{\lambda})^n (v) = v = M(v)$.

(b) Let A and B be two matrices such that $b_{ij} = a_{ij} + r$. Then show that two strategy vectors p and q are optimal for A if and only if they are optimal for B and value of the game B is value of game A plus r .

Solution: Let A and B be $m \times n$ matrices. For any $p = (p_1, \dots, p_m)^t$ and $q = (q_1, \dots, q_n)$,

$$p^t B q = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n b_{ij} p_i q_j = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n (a_{ij} + r) p_i q_j = p^t A q + r.$$

Now let p^* and q^* be an optimal strategy for B . Then

$$pBq^* \leq v(B) \leq p^*Bq \quad \forall p \in \mathbb{R}^m, q \in \mathbb{R}^n.$$

Hence by the calculation above,

$$pAq^* + r \leq v(B) \leq p^*Aq + r \quad \forall p \in \mathbb{R}^m, q \in \mathbb{R}^n,$$

equivalently,

$$pAq^* \leq v(B) - r \leq p^*Aq \quad \forall p \in \mathbb{R}^m, q \in \mathbb{R}^n.$$

This shows that $v(A) = v(B) - r$. We have also shown that p^* and q^* is also an optimal strategy for A as well. By a similar argument as above it can also be shown that an optimal strategy for A is also an optimal strategy for B .

3. (a) Describe and justify a method to avoid anticycling in LP (*Marks: 6*).
 (b) State and prove a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of the matrix entries for a 2×2 - matrix game to be non-strictly determined.

Solution: Let $A = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{pmatrix}$ be a 2×2 matrix corresponding to a matrix game. The game is non-strictly determined if and only if none of the matrix entries is a saddle point. We show that if there is a saddle point then the game is strictly determined, from which the assertion follows. Let a_{12} be a saddle point. Then $a_{12} \leq a_{11}$ and $a_{12} \geq a_{22}$. Then $e_1^t A e_j \geq a_{12}$ for $j = 1, 2$ and $e_i^t A e_2 \leq a_{12}$ for $i = 1, 2$. This shows that $v(A) = a_{12}$ with e_1 and e_2 determining an optimal strategy.

(c) Solve the $n \times n$ -game $A = I_n$ (*Marks: 3*).

Solution: We claim that $p = q = (\frac{1}{n}, \dots, \frac{1}{n})^t$ will provide an optimal strategy for this game. If $r = (r_1, \dots, r_n)^t$ is any other vector in \mathbb{R}^n with $v_1 + \dots + v_n = 1$, then

$$p^t A v = \langle p, v \rangle = \frac{1}{n}.$$

Similarly,

$$v^t A q = \langle v, q \rangle = \frac{1}{n}.$$

This shows that $p = q = (\frac{1}{n}, \dots, \frac{1}{n})^t$ defines an optimal strategy for this game and $v(A) = v(I_n) = \frac{1}{n}$.